

Central Intelligence Agency

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Washington, D. C. 20505

DD/078-230/1

Enclosure Registry

78-4141/B

OLC 78-0075/E

SSCI (complete
pkg.)

Honorable Birch Bayh, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

18 APR 1978

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are my responses to the Committee's supplementary questions on the Directorate of Operations personnel reduction exercise (Q#1323).

It now appears that the personnel reductions required in FY 1979 to reach our goal of [] employees for the Operations Directorate will not be as severe as was required in FY 1978. We still intend to reduce the Directorate by [] positions, but due to a higher rate of attrition, will probably need to separate less than [] employees. I also want to report on our success placing in other Agency components DDO officers who have been chosen for separation. Thus far, [] such employees have been reassigned. As [] of the [] chosen for separation are eligible or will remain with the Agency until they reach eligibility for a retirement annuity (some of these are included in the reassignment figures), the personal hardships from the reduction are much less than we originally feared. These developments are particularly gratifying.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stanfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosures

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee w/encl.
- 1 - ER w/encl.
- 1 - DCI w/encl.
- 1 - DDCI w/encl.
- 1 - OP w/encl.
- 1 - [] w/encl.
- 25X1 1 - [] w/encl.
- 1 - OGC w/encl.
- 1 - OLC Subject w/encl.
- 1 - OLC Chrono w/o encl.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

LC:DFM:hms (10 April 1978)

DDO:JNMcMahon:mob/[] (rewritten 14Apr78)

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Questions for the Record on the DDO Personnel Reductions

Objectives of the Reduction

1. Several possible reasons have been suggested for your reduction in the Directorate of Operations: that the Directorate had too many covert action or paramilitary personnel; that the proportion of Headquarters personnel to field officers was too great; that improved technical collection had reduced the need for human sources; and that there was a need to thin out the senior ranks so as to afford younger officers greater promotion opportunities. Precisely, what was your own reasoning in accepting previous recommendations that the DDO be trimmed?

I ordered reductions in the personnel strength of the Operations Directorate because I believed that Directorate overstaffed for its present day mission. Past Directors as well as Directorate leaders have also perceived this, and as a result there has been a steady reduction and realignment of DDO personnel since the [] authorized positions at the end of FY-1969. As the DDO mission has changed, so have personnel needs. Our ability to decrease the Directorate's size so drastically has resulted from these factors:

25X1

- a. ending of a labor-intensive paramilitary and covert action phase of operations;
- b. refining of the tasking given the Operations Directorate, allocating to it more clearly delineated tasks to perform (e.g., development of technical intelligence capabilities have made it unnecessary to seek and maintain human sources on particular types of targets); and
- c. acquisition of our existing group of covert assets and the techniques to get more as we need them.

Although I realize that morale will be adversely affected in the short term by these reductions, I believe the underutilization of talent, overmanagement, and lack of headroom for career progression, which overstaffing yields, would be a more serious, long-term morale problem.

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

SECRET


SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Objectives of the Reduction

2. What weaknesses do you see in the Directorate of Operations? What changes would you like to see instituted in that Directorate in order to improve performance? Will these changes have any effect upon the personnel needs of the Directorate?

I believe that the Directorate of Operations is producing better intelligence now than at any time in its history. There are still some gaps to be filled but our personnel are competent and are seeking to fill these. Regarding personnel management procedures, I had some questions which I dealt with by assuring a more regular pattern of career progression and by having more and better attention paid to career planning.



25X1

4. The Committee is interested in your evaluation of the contribution you expect the DDO to make to U. S. intelligence. How has this changed in recent years and how do you expect it to change over the next decade?

While there will be obvious changes indicated by changing political perceptions and requirements as well as advances in technology, basically I do not expect the

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Objectives of the Reduction

role of the Operations Directorate to change from its current primary role, which is the collection of secret intelligence through controlled sources. The objectives and priorities of intelligence collection may shift from one year to the next, but we will continue to cover the capabilities and intentions of powers potentially hostile to us, threats to the stability and survival of friendly governments, as well as a variety of developments abroad which bear on U. S. interests--for example, energy-related matters. In this connection, part of a letter sent me by the President's National Security Advisor, Mr. Brzezinski on 14 January 1978 is relevant:

"We need to know more about thoughts and plans of key leaders of groups in important advanced and secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react to our decisions and to those of other powers. More often than not, clandestine collection is likely to be the best source of this information."

Reduction Criteria and Procedures

1. How, and by whom, were the standards and procedures for the recent reductions established?

I approved criteria and procedures for the FY-1978/1979 reductions, based on a DDO recommendation. The criteria were designed to quantify an employee's performance over the past few years, yet permit consideration of special skills. Procedures were spelled out in a memorandum dated 7 October 1977 to all Directorate of Operations employees, a copy of which was provided the Committee prior to my 6 December briefing.

2. A number of public reports have referred to "legal considerations" that prompted the wording of your dismissal memorandum. What were those legal considerations?

The memorandum which public reports have mentioned was not intended to be the last word on the individual's ultimate fate in the Agency, and in fact was simply a memorandum from the Deputy Director for Operations indicating his intention to recommend the separation of the addressee. Since documents by which separation decisions

Reduction Criteria and Procedures

are made could become relevant in any litigation resulting from termination of any employee, it has been the practice to confine such documents to the simplest and most precise language.

3. Were there any instances where personnel who were released did not fall into the bottom five percent of the evaluative criteria? If so, how many and for what reasons?

The answer to the first question is yes, because cuts at the medium and upper levels exceeded five percent. Although the FY-1978 cuts represented only 4.4 percent of the 31 August 1977 on-board strength, 27 supergrades received letters, or approximately 16 percent of those on duty on 31 August 1977. About 8 percent of Directorate personnel at the GS-12 to GS-15 level received letters while less than 5 percent of those in the junior ranks received letters. Precisely because the anticipated cuts were going to exceed 5 percent, we found it necessary to develop additional evaluative criteria. For grades GS-15 and below, a numerical formula was developed to reflect the employees performance. The more points you accumulated, the more likely it was that you would be cut. For the supergrades, we had a different and by definition more subjective procedure. In consultation with the A/DDCI and the DDO I reviewed supergrade employees in the Operations Directorate and then determined who would receive letters. I do not believe the people at the bottom of the supergrade list were poor or marginal performers. All supergraders should have excellent records or they would not have attained that status. Nevertheless, when you compare people and attempt to establish a numerical ranking, some will show better than others and by any objective standard the people at the bottom were also quite good.

4. What truth is there to the allegation that one senior officer, called back from a foreign post to serve on the supergrade selection board for the reduction, later was selected out by his colleagues on that board?

It is correct that one GS-18 officer who served on the GS-16/17 Evaluation Board was subsequently himself nominated for the selection-out process. I regret this particular sequence of events but it is important to bear in mind the chronology. The evaluation panel for GS-16/17

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Reduction Criteria and Procedures

grade officers meets at least once a year for ranking these senior officers. The members of the panel are three or four GS-18 officers who are nominated by the Deputy Director for Operations. When the DDO nominated this officer for the panel, the precise number of GS-18s to be separated had not been determined, and he could not have known that this particular officer would be selected for separation. The man had a distinguished record as Chief of Station and Division Chief.

It is quite wrong, however, to suggest that his colleagues on the GS-16/17 panel were responsible for his being nominated for release. This decision was made elsewhere.

5. How many of the reduction decisions were personally reviewed by the Director?

I personally reviewed all of the supergrade cases. I was aware of the specific numbers recommended for separation at grade GS-15 and below but did not personally review these cases. This was the responsibility of the DDO and his senior associates. I am and will be personally involved in reviewing all those who choose to appeal the decision of the DDO to separate them.

6. Please provide the Committee with the names and positions of all supergrade personnel released under the recent reduction.

I have the responsibility to all of those officers to protect their privacy and to spare them all possible embarrassment. The list of names of those to be released is being very tightly held in the Agency, and I would hope the Committee would understand my wish to protect these officers and not request specific names.

7. Please provide the Committee with the names and positions of all released personnel who had previously testified before or briefed Members of the Committee or its staff.

For the same reason as listed in question 6, i.e., a desire to protect the privacy of employees selected for release, I would strongly prefer not to provide any names of those selected. I can assure you, however, that no employees were selected for release because they testified for or briefed Members or staff of the Committee.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Reduction Criteria and Procedures

8. Do you intend to use the same standards and procedures in the later rounds of reduction, or will there be some changes?

Basically, the same standards will be used. Additional data, specifically the FY-1978 Evaluation Board findings for Grades GS-12 and above, will be factored into the process of identification of those to be separated in FY-1979. We are now updating our statistical information, including the on-going attrition rate, which will permit us to determine more precisely than was possible in our original forecast the exact number at each grade level who will have to be separated in FY-1979.

9. Will persons dismissed in the later stages of this reduction in force, who are within two years of attaining retirement eligibility at the time that they are dismissed, be allowed to remain on duty until they reach retirement eligibility?

Employees separated in the later stages of this reduction will be permitted to remain on duty until they become eligible for an annuity, if this will occur by 31 December 1979.

10. What objections, if any, would you have if this Committee wrote into the CIA's charter a provision stating that when the Director of the CIA used his special authority to terminate personnel for reasons other than security, such decisions could be appealed to an employee appeal board under the Intelligence Community Staff?

A provision in our charter legislation permitting appeals from DCI termination decisions under his special authority, for reasons other than security, to an employee appeal board under the Intelligence Community Staff would not be satisfactory. It would not be appropriate to provide for appeals from decisions of an agency head to a board which is subordinate to that official. In addition, there are sound and compelling policy reasons why the DCI has by statute unfettered termination authority. I have enclosed a copy of my letter to Senator Huddleston on this subject.

Effects of the Reduction

1. You indicated on December 6th that five of the released DDO personnel had been taken on by other elements of the Agency. How many others do you expect will be taken on in this manner? How many of the

SECRET

Effects of the Reduction

500 additional persons whom you plan to release over the next two years do you expect will be hired by other parts of the CIA?

As of 31 March, 57 individuals recommended for separation by the DDO have been reassigned to other elements in the Agency. We expect additional reassignments to occur and will continue to encourage reassignments, but we cannot predict the actual number. Obviously, the reassignment effort depends on vacancies and requirements which exist and a reasonable matching of the individual's qualifications to those requirements.

2. Are any of the reductions in the Operations Directorate being accomplished by transferring an office or a function to another Directorate?

No.

3. Please provide the Committee with a list of those DDO positions that are being abolished and a list of those positions that are being downgraded.

25X1

SECRET

Effects of the Reduction

4. Please report to this Committee on a quarterly basis which positions rated GS-15 or above vacated by the reduction have been filled, and in what ways the new appointees differ from the persons they replaced.

Again let me try to clarify the distinction between positions being eliminated and personnel being asked to leave. The basic fact to recall is that the two lists of positions and personnel are independent of each other. In some cases, a person being asked to leave may have occupied a position to be eliminated, but in most cases, this has not been the case as our position reviews and our personnel reviews have been separate. The after-effects of the reduction will involve shifting personnel out of the positions to be eliminated. In some cases, such personnel may be used to fill slots vacated by the reduction, but this process is still being worked out. We are seeking to keep our key positions overseas constantly filled, so that we expect few if any slots to remain vacant for long.

As we replace officers who have been asked to leave, we will either choose personnel of equivalent experience, or will give a chance to an up-and-coming younger officer with bright career prospects.

I would ask the Committee to reconsider its request for quarterly reports on the specifics of the reduction. I do not believe that this would contribute to the Committee's understanding of the exercise and would constitute a substantial administrative burden on the Agency. I will, of course, keep the Committee informed of the major decision reached, e.g., numbers of personnel identified for separation in each phase.

5. In light of past and current reductions in force, with what confidence can clandestine service personnel engage in long-term career planning? What effect will the risk of early termination after many years of service have upon Agency efforts to recruit and retain professional-caliber officers or paraprofessionals?

I hope that the end result of the reduction and the enhanced career planning will enable the talented career professional to look forward with greater confidence to his future career and its development. We do intend to focus on the low three percent of our employees for possible separation, but this procedure should leave the

SECRET

Effects of the Reduction

vast majority of our employees confident that their advancement is based on their own talents and performance.

Experience has shown that publicity attending CIA reductions in recent years has had little effect on the numbers of inquiries from both professionals and technicians interested in Agency employment. Although a few applicants have questioned the stability of Agency employment in recent months, the current reductions have not deterred people from applying. In fact, the number of inquiries concerning employment possibilities received each month in FY-1978 has exceeded the number received in the corresponding month of FY-1977. The quality of these applicants remains high.

CIA's attrition rate for professionals and technicians in the years following Agency-wide reductions imposed by Mr. Schlesinger has ranged between five and seven percent. As the turnover of professionals in the rest of the Federal Government is about 15 percent a year, it is clear that the Agency has experienced no difficulty in retaining professionals and technicians in spite of well-publicized reductions in its work force.

6. Have there been any resignations or retirements by Directorate of Operations personnel who were not affected by the recent reduction but who may have been upset by the manner in which it was conducted?

The Office of Personnel has no specific evidence that the manner in which the DDO reduction was conducted had any subsequent bearing on the decisions of other DDO employees to resign.

7. Based on normal attrition rates, how many of the 215 new persons to be hired by the Agency in FY-1978 do you expect will still be employed by the Agency two years later? How many will still be employed four years later? For the years 1974 to 1976, what proportion of employee attrition (other than through death or disability) fell into the following categories:

- a. Mandatory age retirements
- b. Early retirement, age 55-59
- c. Early retirement, age 50-54
- d. Persons not eligible for retirement

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6


Effects of the Reduction

8. In 1977, what proportion of employee attrition and pending retirements (other than those required under your reduction in force) fell into the various categories listed in Question #21?

With consideration of the composition of the 215, which includes clericals as well as professionals, recent experience would indicate that 198 would still be employed at the end of two years and 183 after four. Our studies of attrition would indicate that we experience comparatively higher attrition of (1) young, more mobile employees who have not yet built up much retirement credit and (2) clerical personnel in particular. After ten years of service, the attrition rate drops to one percent per annum or less, until retirement eligibility is established. Though our experience parallels that of other agencies, our attrition rates tend to be somewhat lower.

1974 to 1976 and 1977 data on attrition are presented in the following table:

Operations Directorate: Employee Attrition
(excluding death and disability)

	Data in percent	
	<u>1974-1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
Mandatory age retirements		
Early Retirements		
Age 55-59		
Age 50-54		
Separations of persons not eligible for retirement		
Other*		
Total Separations (excluding death and disability)	100%	100%

25X1

*This category includes non-mandatory retirements at ages less than 50 or more than 59.


SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Effects Upon the Counterintelligence Function

1. How many counterintelligence personnel, including supergrades, were included in last month's reduction? How many of these were from the Research and Analysis Group? Do you intend to release more counterintelligence personnel over the next two years?



25X1

Lest the Committee be disturbed by this numerical reduction, let me assure you that we are compensating for this by increasing the overall awareness of the counterintelligence threat within the Directorate by placing greater emphasis on counterintelligence training. Greater command attention is also being focused on counterintelligence matters in the day-to-day running of the Directorate and its Stations.

2. A paper sent to the Select Committee by the Intelligence Community Staff on November 7, 1977, entitled "Response to SSCI Questions Concerning Counterintelligence," indicates that U. S. counterintelligence strength has declined over the past 15 years, despite the increasing numbers of Soviet intelligence personnel engaged in activities directed at U. S. targets. In view of this, what consideration has been given to increasing the number of officers devoted to counterintelligence operations?

The numbers of Soviet intelligence personnel targeted against the U. S. has increased over the past 15 years, most dramatically in the United States, where Soviet official presence has increased from 333 to 1189 in this period. As you know, Soviet presence in the United States is the responsibility of the FBI, which is now increasing the number of agents assigned to counterintelligence. Regarding CIA's responsibility for counterintelligence abroad, the whole thrust of our program has changed, from vesting counterintelligence responsibilities in a tightly compartmented staff to attempting to sensitize

Effects Upon the Counterintelligence Function

and involve all Agency officers in the counterintelligence threat. This makes it possible to reduce the size of the CI Staff.

Future Objectives

1. Will the vacancies which are to be filled in the Directorate of Operations be filled from the ranks of veteran CIA personnel? What promotion criteria will you use? Can you assure this Committee that each person who is promoted into these vacancies will be more qualified than the person who was released?

The vacancies occurring in the Directorate of Operations are normally filled from the ranks of veteran CIA officers. Newly recruited officer-level personnel enter at the bottom. Lateral entry takes place very rarely. Normal promotion criteria are used, i.e., all officers are rated on a competitive basis by panels, the members of which are, where possible, at least two grades senior to the personnel rated. Those who are ranked in the upper 20 to 30 percent of the panel have a likely prospect of promotion, if not immediately then in the next year or two. The number of individuals promoted at any given time will vary depending on headroom, attrition, average grade criteria imposed by the Office of Management and Budget, and so forth.

I cannot assure the Committee that each person who is promoted into the vacancies created by the release of the incumbent will be more qualified than his predecessor. We hope that the new employee will be at least similarly qualified, while more energetic and with greater growth potential. They will be less experienced, certainly, but we must proceed on the assumption that no one is irreplaceable and that there must be a logical and carefully phased rejuvenation at all levels, including the senior ones. Sixty percent of the GS-16s and 17s affected by the FY-1978 cuts were five years or less from mandatory retirement. So the question in any case is not whether we keep them forever, but whether we want to phase them out now to make way for younger officers on their way up.

2. Do you plan to institute any reductions in CIA personnel outside the Directorate of Operations?

I do not believe any other CIA directorates are over strength, and so plan no reductions in personnel strength

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Future Objectives

outside the Directorate of Operations. In fact, I am recommending small personnel increases for FY-1979 for the Directorates of Science and Technology, Administration, and a substantial increase in the National Foreign Assessments Center. All Agency components will be subject to continued close scrutiny to develop optimum personnel levels.

3. Do you see a need for any reductions in Intelligence Community personnel outside the CIA?

I have not yet had the opportunity to form an opinion on this question, but I contemplate looking into personnel strength of other intelligence agencies very carefully.

Personnel and Career Development Practices

1. What efforts is the Agency making to deal with the possibility that Operations Directorate personnel affected by the recent reductions or by subsequent reductions will become so disaffected as to "go public" with their grievances or to misuse the clandestine skills which they have acquired in the Agency?

As you are aware, we are working with the Department of Justice to try to validate the secrecy oath which all CIA employees sign when they are accepted for employment. The case we have chosen involves Frank Snepp's book on Vietnam. I believe it is vital to validate this secrecy oath or, failing that, to have some legislation which can assure our employees, our agents and the liaison services that cooperate with us that CIA's secrecy oath is permanently binding on us all.

Regarding your concern that employees being released will "go public" with their grievances, I, of course, hope this is not the case. The Agency has a fair, effective, and well-publicized grievance handling system. In addition, the individual employee can address his immediate supervisors, the Inspector General, the Director of Personnel or the Director. Indeed, I have received communications from current or former employees who felt free to comment on one or another aspect of my management of the Agency. I welcome such communications and reply to them personally, time permitting. Others are handled by my staff. On the other hand, I deplore the fact that some employees or former employees wish to air their problems with the Agency in

SECRET

SECRET

Personnel and Career Development Practices

public. I think this helps them little and it certainly damages the Agency. In any case, management policies cannot be changed because of the threat of publicity. The Agency cannot be run if the threat of "going public" could act as a veto over the actions of management.

As to your second point, the possible misuse of the clandestine skills, I wish to emphasize in the strongest possible terms that the absolutely overwhelming majority of our personnel are patriotic and law abiding. This applies equally to those who were cut in the FY-1978 reduction or who will leave during FY-1979. I do not believe that they would consider undertaking actions which are unethical or illegal, simply because they have been or will be separated. If some do, it is a matter for the law enforcement authorities.

2. Do you think it necessary, if the Directorate of Operations is to have an up-or-out personnel system, for the Agency to accept the responsibility of providing its DDO officers with skills and experience which will enable them to find jobs in the outside world? If so, what concrete steps do you intend to take to fulfill that responsibility?

The Agency intends to focus on the low three percent of its employees for possible separation. This is what I have always construed to be an up-or-out policy. By instituting this policy across the board, we will not be concentrating only on employees in their 40s or 50s who are approaching the end of their career in any case. We will focus at all levels.

It is, of course, our hope that employees who leave the Agency under any circumstances will be successful. I believe that the skills they acquire, the ability to deal with and judge people, the ability to write, the willingness to make tough decisions are all highly marketable. We will do all we can to aid our employees in seeking employment elsewhere through counselling and outplacement services. In addition, a proposal is now under consideration within the Agency to seek legislative authority to offer up to two years of training to employees being separated.

SECRET

Washington, D.C. 20501

10 September 1977

The Honorable Walter D. Huddleston, Chairman
Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

My apologies for taking so long to respond to your letter of July 21st (R#9090) with its questions on the importance to the Central Intelligence Agency of retaining section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, which authorizes termination of Agency employees "in the interests of the United States" notwithstanding the provisions of other law. As I mentioned to you briefly orally, I believe that this particular provision of law is an essential ingredient maintaining both a secure and effective intelligence service for our country.

The sensitivity and the delicacy of the activities legally and properly performed by the Agency for our Government simply demand that we must have the utmost confidence in those individuals to whom we delegate the authorities for carrying out various of these activities. We cannot, in many instances, afford to determine by trial and error whether a man can be trusted to perform in accordance with legality and the standards of propriety which have been established for him by his superiors. If there is any doubt in our minds as to the total reliability of one of our officers on such sensitive assignments, we simply must forego the execution of that assignment. Put in another way, I simply cannot come to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and other oversight bodies and give assurance of the Central Intelligence Agency's performing in the way the Congress and the President have directed if I lack confidence in those to whom I must entrust the execution of our programs.

Enclosed are the statistics you asked for on the use of this authority over the past 15 years. Unfortunately, this Agency does not maintain statistics on those employees terminated under section 102(c), who were later declared eligible for U.S. Government employment by the U.S. Civil Service Commission, as the responsibility for obtaining Civil Service eligibility rests with the employee. Please note, however,

Unclassified when separated
from enclosure

SECRET


that although this authority has been used sparingly in the past, the existence of such authority has been very instrumental in the management of our personnel. In the seven months I have held this office, I have personally given the option to four employees of resignation/retirement or involuntary termination under the provisions of section 102(c). In two of these instances, the individuals had mixed their official business at the Agency with the conduct of favors for friends who were former members of the Agency. In so doing, they placed the Agency and the U.S. Government in a position of apparent involvement in activities with which we neither had nor desired any part. The other two employees had each specifically failed to carry out orders of their superiors in the field. It was my opinion that if we cannot count on subordinates carrying out their orders and being truthful to us about what they are doing, the operations arm of our Agency will soon be out of control. All four of these individuals elected to resign/retire. I do not believe that they could have been induced to do so under the normal Civil Service regulations for separation or at least not for an extended period of time. I would further add that perhaps the greatest benefit to the Agency in these four cases was the message it transmitted of our policy with respect to these types of activities. In short, limited functioning of the authority under section 102(c) can be a powerful yeast in the meal.

It is, of course, equally important that our employees be protected against arbitrariness on the part of any Director in the execution of this authority. ~~Speaking~~ from a position of prejudice, I can only say that I believe the oversight procedures now extant are adequate to inhibit or at the least uncover such arbitrariness if it existed. Not the least of these is the existence of the Intelligence Oversight Board to which any aggrieved employee may appeal. Beyond that, the existence of both the Senate Select Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence serves much the same function. Finally, I can only say that I have personally agonized over the four decisions I mentioned to you. I do not believe that any Director could do less in the face of the responsibilities involved.

I would be most happy to discuss this matter with you or your Subcommittee in person or to provide further information if this would be of assistance.

Enclosure

Yours sincerely



STANSFIELD TURNER

APR 11 9 30 AM '78

ER

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

DD/O 78-23011
Enclosure
78-4141/A

Washington, D. C. 20505

OLC 78-0075/E
18 APR 1978

18 A

Honorable Birch Bayh, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are my responses to the Committee's supplementary questions on the Directorate of Operations personnel reduction exercise (Q#1323).

It now appears that the personnel reductions required in FY 1979 to reach our goal of [] employees for the Operations Directorate will not be as severe as was required in FY 1978. We still intend to reduce the Directorate by [] positions, but due to a higher rate of attrition, will probably need to separate less than [] employees. I also want to report on our success placing in other Agency components DDO officers who have been chosen for separation. Thus far, [] such employees have been reassigned. [] chosen for separation are eligible or will remain with the Agency until they reach eligibility for a retirement annuity (some of these are included in the reassignment figures), the personal hardships from the reduction are much less than we originally feared. These developments are particularly gratifying.

Yours sincerely,

/s/

STANSFIELD TURNER

Distribution: Enclosures

- Original - Addressee w/encl.
- 1 - ER w/encl.
- 1 - DCI w/encl.
- 1 - DDCI w/encl.
- 1 - OP w/encl.
- 1 - CMS/DDO w/encl.
- 1 - SA/DO/O w/encl.
- 1 - OGC w/encl.
- 1 - OLC Subject w/encl.
- 1 - OLC Chrono w/o encl.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

OLC:DFM:hms (10 April 1978)
DDO:JNMcMahon:mob/ [] (rewritten 14Apr78)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040029-6